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 Normative Foundations for 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
Hamish Stewart* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 provides 
that “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure.” It is now well established that section 8 protects a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy, but no more than that: state action 
engages the section 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure if, 
but only if, it affects a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.2 State 
action that does not affect a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, 
even if called a “search” or a “seizure” in ordinary language and in 
reasons for judgment, does not engage section 8. Put another way, if state 
action affects a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, it must be 
“reasonable” as that term is understood in section 8 jurisprudence: the 
search must be authorized by law, the law authorizing the search must be 
reasonable (i.e., constitutionally valid), and the manner in which the 
search is conducted must be reasonable.3 A search that fails to meet any 
one of these three criteria is unreasonable and violates section 8. But if 
state action does not affect a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, 
it does not have to comply with section 8 and therefore does not have to 
be shown to be reasonable. In particular, it does not have to be authorized 
                                                                                                             
* Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I am very grateful to Lisa Austin and Jamie  
Cameron for their comments on a draft of this paper.  
1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2  Some early cases leave room for the possibility that s. 8 might protect more than a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy: see, for instance, Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of 
Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Southam”]. This possibility has largely been disregarded in the more recent 
cases on point. 
3  R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Collins”]. 
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by law.4 So the stakes in the determination of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy are high. 
What is a “reasonable expectation of privacy”? The Supreme Court 
of Canada’s methodology for determining this question appears on the 
surface to be well settled because the list of factors to be considered has 
been clearly stated and restated in the leading cases. But it is not at all 
clear how the relevant factors are supposed to contribute to a finding 
concerning a reasonable expectation of privacy because there are (at 
least) two distinct normative strands of argument at work in the cases. I 
will call these strands “the risk approach” and “the surveillance ap-
proach”. Both approaches involve an assessment of the vulnerability of 
the Charter applicant’s privacy to intrusion by others, but they emphasize 
different aspects of this vulnerability. Under the risk approach, the most 
important factors typically relate to the empirical ability of others, 
whether they are state agents or not and whether they act lawfully or not, 
to obtain access to the evidence or information. Questions of the ease or 
difficulty of physical access and of whether the accused should be 
deemed to have waived or abandoned his privacy therefore dominate the 
analysis. Under the surveillance approach, the central question is whether 
the investigative technique at issue intrudes on privacy in a manner that 
raises constitutional concerns about its unfettered use. The most impor-
tant factors typically relate to the impact of the technique on the values 
protected by the privacy interest. But the Court has not clearly committed 
itself to either approach, so even where the facts are essentially undis-
puted, it is difficult to anticipate whether the Court will find a reasonable 
expectation of privacy because the different normative strands may 
suggest different outcomes.  
In this paper, I outline the two approaches and argue that the surveil-
lance approach better reflects the values underlying section 8 of the 
Charter because it highlights the central normative question: in light of 
the reasons for recognizing a constitutionally protected privacy interest, 
does our conception of the proper relationship between the state and the 
individual permit the use of the investigative technique in question 
without specific legal authorization? I then discuss two cases from 2010 
in which the Supreme Court of Canada had to decide whether an accused 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy: R. v. Nolet5 and R. v. Gomboc.6 
                                                                                                             
4  R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at para. 11 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Evans”]. 
5  [2010] S.C.J. No. 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nolet”]. 
6  [2010] S.C.J. No. 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gomboc”]. 
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In Nolet, the Court was unanimous in recognizing a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the living area of a tractor-trailer. Though the main 
issue in the case was the legality of the search, the Court’s holding 
concerning the reasonable expectation of privacy is consistent with the 
surveillance approach. But in Gomboc, the Court was seriously divided 
as to whether the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information concerning the pattern of electricity usage in a residence. 
The division of opinion illustrates both the striking differences between 
the two approaches and the dangers to the value of privacy posed by the 
risk approach. 
II. A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
1. The Court’s Methodology 
The standard methodology for determining whether a Charter appli-
cant, typically an accused person,7 has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy is as follows.8 A judge should consider the following questions: 
• Does the accused have a subjective expectation of privacy? While 
this is a fact-specific question, the existence of a subjective expecta-
tion is readily inferred in many situations, e.g., where the place in-
truded upon is the accused’s home9 or body. 
• If the accused does have a subjective expectation of privacy, is that 
expectation objectively reasonable? In deciding that question, a 
judge should consider the totality of the circumstances, including 
factors such as:10 
                                                                                                             
7  A person does not have to be accused of an offence to claim a violation of his or her s. 8 
rights. See, for instance, Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 73, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 
3 (S.C.C.). However, I will generally refer to the Charter claimant as “the accused” because that is 
the context in which the s. 8 right has developed. But a narrow construction of the right in the 
criminal context will reduce the possibility of a successful Charter claim in other contexts. If a 
particular form of electronic surveillance is held not to affect a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy, then the state can use it to observe people for any reason, without engaging (much less 
infringing) s. 8. 
8  See also the overview of this topic in James A. Fontana & David Keeshan, The Law of 
Search and Seizure in Canada, 7th ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2007), at 5-29. 
9  R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 37 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Tessling”]; Gomboc, supra, note 6, at para. 25, per Deschamps J. 
10  Gomboc, id., at para. 108, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J., dissenting; Tessling, id., at 
para. 19; R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, at para. 45 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Edwards”]. 
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• the subject matter of the search; 
• the place searched; 
• whether the subject matter was in public view; 
• whether the subject matter was abandoned; 
• whether the subject matter was in the hands of third parties and 
subject to a duty of confidentiality; 
• the degree of intrusiveness of the search; in cases of informa-
tional privacy, this factor refers especially to the question wheth-
er the technique revealed “any intimate details of the [accused’s] 
lifestyle, or information of a biographical nature”;11, and 
• the legal framework for the search. 
Moreover, the Court has identified three distinct but potentially overlap-
ping types of privacy interests: 
• personal privacy, i.e., an individual’s interest in the privacy of his or 
her body; 
• territorial privacy, i.e., a person’s interest in a particular physical 
location, such as his or her home or office; 
• informational privacy, i.e., a person’s interest in records (such as 
medical charts, banking statements, academic transcripts and pat-
terns of computer usage) that reveal information about him or her.12 
The factors relevant to the determination of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy may play out differently depending on which kind of privacy 
interest is at stake. For example, the question of abandonment would 
rarely be relevant in connection with personal privacy, but is frequently a 
point of contention in connection with informational privacy. 
2. Two Approaches 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions reveal at least two, poten-
tially incompatible, ways of orienting the factors in deciding whether a 
particular accused has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular 
situation. I will call these the “risk approach” and the “surveillance 
approach”.13 Under the risk approach, the focus of the inquiry is on the 
                                                                                                             
11  Tessling, id., at para. 32; compare R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, 
at para. 20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Plant”]. 
12  Gomboc, supra, note 6, at para. 19; Tessling, supra, note 9, at paras. 21-24. 
13  Lisa Austin has used the terms “descriptive” and “normative” for these two positions; she 
has also called the first the “what did you expect” approach: Lisa M. Austin, “Information Sharing 
and the ‘Reasonable Ambiguities’ of Section 8 of the Charter” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 499, at 506-10. 
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security of the place searched (or information obtained) from intrusion 
by the world at large. If the place searched is not in fact secure against 
the world in general, then it is not secure against agents of the state in 
particular, and so any expectation that the state will not intrude is not 
reasonable. The accused, by failing to adequately secure his or her 
interests against intrusions from the world at large, is deemed to have 
accepted the potential intrusion on his or her privacy interests and so 
cannot complain if the person who intrudes happens to be an agent of the 
state.  
The risk approach is well-illustrated by the reasoning and the out-
come in Edwards14 and Patrick.15 In Edwards, the police obtained 
evidence against the accused in the course of a police search of his 
girlfriend’s apartment. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
accused had no standing to argue for exclusion of the evidence because 
he had no reasonable expectation of privacy. He could not control access 
to the apartment; he was, on the factual findings of the courts below, “no 
more than an especially privileged guest” in the apartment.16 Why do 
these facts matter? The Court does not explain that very clearly, but the 
underlying idea seems to be that because he “could not be free from 
intrusion or interference in [his girlfriend’s] apartment” by the world at 
large, he could not object to intrusion or interference by the police. The 
accused could not prevent his girlfriend, or a stranger, from discovering 
evidence against him in the apartment and turning it over to the police; 
he took the risk that the evidence would be discovered, so he could not 
complain if the intruder was a police officer, even if the officer’s search 
of the girlfriend’s apartment was blatantly unlawful.17 Similarly, in 
Patrick, the accused was found to have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in bags of garbage left on his property, near the property line, for 
pick-up. Although the garbage amounted to “bag[s] of ‘information’” 
that could reveal a great deal about the accused’s activities within his 
home,18 and although there was a municipal by-law that prohibited 
anyone other than the garbage collectors from taking it,19 the accused 
                                                                                                             
14  Supra, note 10. 
15  R. v. Patrick, [2009] S.C.J. No. 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Patrick”]. 
16  Edwards, supra, note 10, at para. 47. 
17  Id., at para. 51. The majority does not decide whether the search was unlawful; they hold 
that the accused could not object to it under s. 8 even if it was unlawful. Justice La Forest, 
concurring in the result, thought that the search was best described as a “constructive break-in” (at 
para. 69). 
18  Patrick, supra, note 15, at para. 30. 
19  Id., at para. 68. 
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was deemed to have abandoned any expectation of privacy he might 
otherwise have had in the bag. Anyone could have picked it up, lawfully 
or not: 
The bags were unprotected and within easy reach of anyone walking 
by in a public alleyway, including street people, bottle pickers, urban 
foragers, nosey neighbours and mischievous children, not to mention 
dogs and assorted wildlife, as well as the garbage collectors and  
the police.20 
That the garbage was picked up by the police, not a homeless person or a 
raccoon (neither of whom would be likely to turn it over to the state), 
was just a risk that the accused ran. 
Under the surveillance approach, the focus of the inquiry is on the 
question whether a reasonable person would anticipate that an agent of 
the state would be able to intrude on the accused’s privacy interests with 
no specific legal authority to do so. That a private party, or even a state 
agent, might in fact have the ability to intrude is not determinative; that 
the accused has accepted possible intrusions by non-state actors is not 
determinative. The central concern is the impact of the state’s investiga-
tive technique on the accused’s privacy. 
The classic exemplars of the surveillance approach are the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s cases on electronic surveillance from the early 1990s. 
Consider, for example, R. v. Duarte.21 The police installed audio-visual 
recording equipment in an informer’s apartment. A conversation among 
the accused, the informer, an undercover officer, and others was captured 
by this equipment. The making of the recording was not unlawful 
because the informer consented to the recording pursuant to what is now 
s. 184(2)(a) of the Criminal Code;22 moreover, both the informer and the 
undercover officer could have testified at trial to the content of their 
conversations with the accused, pursuant to the hearsay exception for 
party admissions.23 Nonetheless, a strong majority of the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that the accused had a reasonable expectation that his 
conversations would not be recorded without judicial authorization. The 
Court was concerned that if such an expectation was not recognized, the 
                                                                                                             
20  Id., at para. 55. 
21  [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Duarte”]. 
22  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46; formerly s. 178.11(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. 
23  Compare R. v. Sanelli, [1987] O.J. No. 821, 61 O.R. (2d) 385, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. 
C.A.), revd Duarte, supra, note 21; see also R. v. Fliss, [2002] S.C.J. No. 15, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 535 
(S.C.C.), where an undercover officer’s testimony about his conversation with the accused was 
admissible even though a recording of the conversation was excluded on Charter grounds. 
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state would have an unfettered power “to make permanent electronic 
recordings of our private communications”. The risk approach was 
expressly considered and rejected. The flaw in the argument “that a man 
has no one but himself to blame if he is confounded by his own words”24 
was that it provided no effective check on the power of state agents to 
conduct electronic surveillance of anyone, criminal or otherwise: 
To countenance this practice would not strike only at the expectations 
of privacy of criminals and those concerned with wrongdoing. Rather, it 
would undermine the expectations of privacy of all those who set store 
on the right to live in reasonable security and freedom from 
surveillance, be it electronic or otherwise.25 
The risk of having one’s words reported by an informant or undercover 
officer was “of a different order of magnitude” than the risk of having 
one’s private conversations electronically recorded. 
In some cases, the factors relevant to the reasonable expectation of 
privacy may point in the same direction regardless of the approach 
chosen. In R. v. Kang-Brown, 26 for example, the Court was unanimously 
of the view that a passenger in a bus depot had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his luggage, and indeed a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in any odours that, though undetectable by humans, were detectable by 
sniffer dogs.27 The Court assumes rather than analyzing this expectation 
of privacy, but it is supportable on either approach. The risk that non-
humans will detect odours from our luggage is not one that we take when 
we put our suitcases in the belly of a bus. And the unsupervised use of 
the technique would significantly compromise privacy interests in 
luggage (who knows what other substances, lawful or unlawful, a dog 
can be trained to detect?). But some cases are strongly affected by the 
choice of approach. In Duarte, where the majority found a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the risk analysis supports the opposite conclusion 
that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his conver-
sation with the informant.28 In Edwards, where the majority found no 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the surveillance approach might 
support the opposite conclusion; a reasonable person would assume that 
                                                                                                             
24  Duarte, id., at para. 38. 
25  Id., at para. 41. 
26  [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kang-Brown”].  
27  Though unanimous on this point, the Court was badly divided on the question whether 
the police were authorized at common law to intrude on this expectation of privacy by using a sniffer 
dog without a warrant. 
28  Duarte, supra, note 21, at para. 58, per Lamer J. concurring in the result. 
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the police would conduct themselves lawfully and so would not antici-
pate an unlawful search of his friend’s apartment. So there might be a 
reasonable expectation of privacy against unlawful searches in general, 
lest the state in its sole discretion could decide to violate the rights of 
third parties for investigative purposes.29 
3. Normative Foundations 
Strikingly, none of the factors invoked in the standard methodology 
for determining a reasonable expectation of privacy is explicitly norma-
tive; all of them are facts about the relationship between the accused and 
the place searched or thing seized. But whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is not a purely factual question because it is a 
question of what ought to be the case. What ought to be done in any 
given situation never depends solely on the facts, but always on the facts 
in conjunction with the applicable norms. Thus, while normative conclu-
sions are typically dependent on the facts,30 a normative conclusion 
cannot be derived solely from the facts.31 So in deciding whether a 
Charter applicant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, a judge must 
not only consider the presence or absence of the factors identified by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, but also why and how those factors are 
important in defining the right to a reasonable expectation of privacy. Put 
another way, the ultimate normative question is whether, in light of the 
impact of an investigative technique on privacy interests, it is right that 
the state should be able to use that technique without any legal authoriza-
tion or judicial supervision. Does our conception of the proper relation-
ship between the investigative branches of the state and the individual 
permit this technique without specific legal authorization? The facts of 
the case are highly relevant to this normative question but do not by 
themselves determine it. 
                                                                                                             
29  Edwards, supra, note 10, at paras. 59 and 69, per La Forest J. concurring in the result. 
30  As emphasized by A.K. Sen, “The Nature and Classes of Prescriptive Judgments” (1967) 
17 Philosophical Quarterly 46. 
31  As famously suggested in 1740, by David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, L.A. 
Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), at 469-70; see, more recently, Scott J. Shapiro, 
Legality (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2011), at 45-49. The long tradition that 
questions the fact/value distinction typically does not claim that normative conclusions can be drawn 
from facts alone, and so does not directly contradict Hume’s Law; instead, the key move is to 
emphasize the common elements in reasoning about facts and in reasoning about norms: see, for 
instance, Cheryl Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality (London: Routledge, 2000). 
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The Supreme Court of Canada has clearly recognized the normative 
nature of the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy. As Binnie J. 
put it in Tessling, “Expectation of privacy is a normative rather than a 
descriptive standard.”32 Moreover, some of the specific factors mentioned 
in Tessling and Edwards, such as the intrusiveness of the search in relation 
to the asserted privacy interest, seem intended to focus the judge’s atten-
tion on the desirability of permitting the unauthorized use of the technique. 
And the choice between the risk approach and the surveillance approach, 
or any other approach to determining the existence of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, ultimately depends on those foundations, that is, an 
assessment of which approach better reflects the values supporting the 
section 8 protection for the reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Nevertheless, the Court has not been entirely clear about these nor-
mative foundations. The Court has, on a number of occasions, referred to 
the individual interest in being left alone33 and to the values of autonomy, 
freedom, dignity and integrity,34 but has not said a great deal about 
exactly how these interests and values are protected by a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. There are several ways to make that connection, 
and indeed to relate the section 8 privacy interest to the fundamental 
rights guaranteed in section 2 of the Charter. As Thomas Nagel, Lisa 
Austin and others have argued, everyone needs a sphere that is private in 
the sense of not being readily accessible to others; everyone needs 
“respite from the public gaze” in order to be human.35 And there are at 
least three reasons for this need. First, everyone expresses thoughts and 
emotions, has experiences, and engages in activities that are for various 
reasons not fit for public observation. The public presentation of oneself 
involves restraint in the expression of emotions and attitudes; but 
sometimes we need to dispense with restraint; “we need privacy to be 
allowed to conduct ourselves in extremis in a way that serves purely 
individual demands, the demands of strong personal emotion.”36 Many 
activities, though perfectly ordinary and in no way inherently wrongful 
or shameful — sleeping, using the toilet, cleaning oneself, dressing and 
undressing — are considered embarrassing or humiliating if viewed by 
                                                                                                             
32  Tessling, supra, note 9, at para. 42; see also Gomboc, supra, note 6, at para. 34. 
33  Southam, supra, note 2, at 159 S.C.R.; Duarte, supra, note 21, at 49 S.C.R. 
34  Plant, supra, note 11, at para. 17; R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 
679, at paras. 89-90 and 98 (S.C.C.). 
35  Lisa M. Austin, “Privacy and the Question of Technology” (2003) 22 Law & Philosophy 
119, at 147 [hereinafter “Austin, ‘Privacy’”]. 
36  Thomas Nagel, “Concealment and Exposure” (1998) 27 Philosophy & Public Affairs 3, 
at 19 [hereinafter “Nagel”]. 
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others.37 That is why surreptitious observation or recording of some of 
these activities is a criminal offence.38 Some activities may be under-
taken for pleasure or relaxation — sitting around in one’s underwear, 
playing “air guitar”, singing really badly, reading comic books — yet 
public observation or knowledge of them may be embarrassing or 
inhibiting. And some pursuits may be exploratory or preparatory to a 
public presentation, yet undertaken in private to prevent others from 
drawing improper inferences from them. Practising the piano is often 
preparation for a public performance; but the pianist typically does not 
want the public to hear the slow, laborious and error-ridden process of 
learning, repeating and experimenting that precedes the performance. 
Similarly, the project of reading all the politically important books of the 
20th century requires no legal justification, but publication of one’s 
reading list might invite unwarranted speculation about why one is 
reading How to be a Good Communist;39 and knowledge that one’s 
reading lists would routinely be made available to state agents might 
affect one’s reading choices. 
Second, privacy enables intimate activities, that is, activities involving 
small numbers of individuals who wish to interact with each other, but 
only with each other. Sexual activity is the most obvious example: though 
it is neither wrongful nor intrinsically shameful, most people require 
privacy to engage in it.40 But there are many other examples. Musical 
ensembles rehearse in private, for the same reasons as soloists. Most 
people need a private space to engage in casual conversations in which 
opinions may be stated in ways inappropriate for a public forum, perhaps 
because they are stated too strongly or too absolutely or in ways that are 
prone to be misunderstood, or because they are not fully considered. 
Thus, privacy “protects two aspects of individuality: our ability to be 
distinct individuals and our ability to have an authentic inner life and 
intimate relationships”.41 And, in protecting these two aspects of indi-
viduality, privacy has a third function: it makes possible the construction 
of a public persona through which the individual can participate in those 
                                                                                                             
37  Id., at 18. I take no position on whether the reasons that these activities are embarrassing 
are merely conventional or derive from more basic psychological or biological needs. 
38  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 162(1). The offence is commonly known as 
“voyeurism”. 
39  Liu Shao-Chi, How to be a Good Communist (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951). 
40  Nagel, supra, note 36, at 20; J. David Velleman, “The Genesis of Shame” (2001) 30 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 [hereinafter “Velleman”]. Compare, again, s. 162(1) of the Criminal 
Code. 
41  Austin, “Privacy”, supra, note 35, at 147. 
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institutions and conventions that make social and political life possible. 
If there was no private space, the distinction between the individual and 
his or her self-presentation would be obliterated, leaving no room for the 
possibility of distinguishing one’s considered public behaviour, positions 
and attitudes from one’s private activity. Moreover, the possibility of 
surreptitious surveillance deprives the individual of control over how he 
or she presents himself or herself to the rest of the world. Thus, privacy 
enables not only activities typically thought of as private, but also those 
typically thought of as public.42 
All three of these functions of privacy would be seriously inhibited if 
individuals were routinely exposed to the gaze of others. Yet all of them 
are necessary to being human. And many of them are closely connected 
with the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and 
opinion protected by section 2(a) and (b) of the Charter. To be free to 
think and to form beliefs and opinions requires not just public spaces for 
expression and debate but also private spaces for thought and contempla-
tion, for reading controversial and uncontroversial material alike, for 
exploring with friends and colleagues ideas that may later be qualified or 
rejected.43  
We can now see why the surveillance approach is preferable to the 
risk approach. The risk approach tends to underrate the interests pro-
tected by privacy because it focuses principally on the vulnerability of 
one’s private space rather than on the value of that space. In contrast, the 
surveillance approach takes the factors relevant to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy and considers them in light of the interest in 
maintaining a private space with (at least) these three functions of 
enabling individuality, intimacy and self-presentation. The risk approach 
often takes the fact that intrusion is empirically possible as decisively 
eliminating any reasonable expectation of privacy; the surveillance 
approach asks instead whether any given intrusion should be permitted 
without legal authorization, in light of the inhibiting effects of the 
intrusion on the activities protected by privacy. 
Consider Duarte again. On the risk approach, the accused had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the recordings of his conversations 
with the informant because there was nothing to stop the informant from 
disclosing the conversations to the police. Justice La Forest rejected the 
                                                                                                             
42  Velleman, supra, note 40, at 35-37; Lisa M. Austin, “Privacy and Private Law: The Di-
lemma of Justification” (2010) 55 McGill L.J. 165, at 202-204. 
43  Austin, “Privacy”, supra, note 35, at 146. 
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argument that this risk destroyed the accused’s expectation of privacy 
because he was concerned about the invasiveness on the private sphere 
of unrestricted recording of private conversations. “No set of laws,” he 
said, can protect us from the risk “that their interlocutors will divulge 
communications that are meant to be private.”44 But electronic surveil-
lance presented “the much more insidious danger inherent in allowing 
the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words”: 
… if the state were free, at its sole discretion, to make permanent 
electronic recordings of our private communications, there would be no 
meaningful residuum to our right to live our lives free from 
surveillance. The very efficacy of electronic surveillance is such that it 
has the potential, if left unregulated, to annihilate any expectation that 
our communications will remain private. A society which exposed us, 
at the whim of the state, to the risk of having a permanent electronic 
recording made of our words every time we opened our mouths might 
be superbly equipped to fight crime, but would be one in which privacy 
no longer had any meaning.45 
Indeed, for the reasons La Forest J. gives, the logic behind the risk 
approach could undermine long-standing and well-recognized protec-
tions for privacy in other areas. Suppose that the accused’s interlocutor in 
Duarte had not been a police informant, but had gone to the police with 
his concerns after the fact. From the accused’s point of view, the risk in 
this hypothetical is the same as the risk in Duarte. But no-one seemed to 
think that in the hypothetical a warrant would not be required to intercept 
the conversation; while the Criminal Code clearly required one, if there 
was no reasonable expectation of privacy, section 8 of the Charter would 
not.46 Similarly, if Joe writes Bill a letter, there is nothing to stop Bill 
from showing the letter to the police. But that does not mean Joe has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his mail. A warrant is undoubtedly 
required to open it.47 And the risk (indeed, the likelihood) that a passer-
by might overhear me practising a Chopin nocturne is not at all the same 
as the risk that the state might surreptitiously record all of my practice 
sessions. The first is an unavoidable consequence of the impossibility of 
                                                                                                             
44  Duarte, supra, note 21, at para. 21. 
45  Id., at para. 22. 
46  The interception would be unlawful under the Code, but would not violate s. 8 of the 
Charter because it would not intrude on a reasonable expectation of privacy. A search has to be 
lawful to be reasonable, but if the police conduct is not a search, the reasonableness — and therefore 
the lawfulness — requirement does not apply. 
47  See, for instance, R. v. Fry, [1999] N.J. No. 352, 142 C.C.C. (3d) 166 (Nfld. C.A.). 
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perfect sound-proofing, while the prospect of the second would seriously 
inhibit my preparation. 
Now, the privacy interests protected by section 8, as I have de-
scribed them, may seem weak in the typical search and seizure case 
where the accused is growing marijuana in his basement or making 
Ecstasy in his garage. These activities have little in common with those 
protected by the interests in authenticity, intimacy and self-presentation 
that I described above. But the Supreme Court of Canada has consis-
tently maintained that the legality or illegality of the activity conducted 
in a place does not affect the determination of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in that place; or, put another way, that the expectation of 
privacy does not depend on the activity being conducted. Everyone has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her bedroom, whether that 
bedroom is used for sleeping, sex, reading, playing air guitar, practising 
the violin, growing marijuana, storing firearms or plotting a murder. 
The reason is not to protect criminal activity; it is to protect lawful 
activity from uncontrolled surveillance. Thus, the Court has consis-
tently recognized that in order to protect the expectation of privacy in a 
place such as the bedroom, the particular activity that occurs there is 
not relevant.48 
Moreover, no place (except, perhaps, the individual’s mind) is im-
mune from search and seizure. The existence of a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in a place does not prevent that place from being searched; 
rather, it requires some lawful authority for the search. So a person 
carrying on an illegal activity in his home might well anticipate a search 
of his home, not because that activity is illegal, but because it is likely to 
generate publicly observable bits of evidence (the odour of marijuana, 
the papered-over windows) giving rise to reasonable grounds on which to 
obtain a search warrant. 
Against this background, I turn to two 2010 cases where the Su-
preme Court of Canada had to determine whether the accused had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
                                                                                                             
48  R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at paras. 18-21 (S.C.C.); Patrick, 
supra, note 15, at para. 32. See also R. v. Silveira, [1995] S.C.J. No. 38, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 
(S.C.C.), where only one of seven judges thought that the illegality of the accused’s activity had any 
effect on his reasonable expectation of privacy. 
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III. R. V. NOLET 
In Nolet,49 the two accused and another were driving in Saskatche-
wan in an apparently empty tractor-trailer. They were pulled over by an 
RCMP officer for a regulatory spot-check. The spot-check developed 
into a search of both the tractor and the trailer. After examining some 
documents, the police officer picked up a duffle bag that he found 
“behind the driver’s seat in the sleeping compartment” of the tractor. The 
bag contained $115,000 in cash in small-denomination bills; on that 
basis, the officer arrested the accused for possession of proceeds of 
crime.50 A further warrantless search of the trailer, conducted some time 
later, revealed a substantial quantity of marijuana in a hidden compart-
ment. The two accused were charged with possession of marijuana for 
the purpose of trafficking and other offences. 
If the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cabin, 
the police taking of the duffle bag would not have been a “search” for 
section 8 purposes, and therefore would not have required any law to 
authorize it. But the Court found that the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the sleeping area of the tractor “because living 
quarters, however rudimentary, should not be classified as a Charter-free 
zone”; though the expectation was “necessarily low” because the tractor 
was “vulnerable to frequent random checks in relation to highway 
transport matters”.51 This reasoning is brief but suggestive. The reference 
to the possibility of frequent regulatory search may suggest a risk 
analysis, but the Court’s reasoning is, for two reasons, better understood 
as an instance of the surveillance approach. First, the fact that truck 
drivers live in their cabs, albeit for short periods, gives them a privacy 
interest in their cabs that is analogous to, if less strong, than the privacy 
interest in the home, and so supports a requirement that the police have 
some legal authority before searching a cab, notwithstanding the vulner-
ability of the cabin to regulatory scrutiny. Second, the “vulnerability” to 
                                                                                                             
49  Supra, note 5. 
50  Id., at para. 9. 
51  Id., at para. 31. The phrase “Charter-free zone” neatly summarizes the concerns underly-
ing the surveillance approach because a zone where the accused has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy is one where he has no s. 8 rights. Since the accused did have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, however low, the taking of the duffle bag was a search for s. 8 purposes and had to be 
authorized by law; similarly for the search of the trailer. The Court held that the taking of the bag 
was authorized by the officer’s power to search without a warrant in relation to provincial regulatory 
offences and that the rest of the search was for the most part a valid incident of the arrest. (An 
assessment of the Court’s reasoning on these points is beyond the scope of this paper.) The accused 
had been acquitted at trial; a new trial was ordered. 
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which the Court refers is not empirical vulnerability to the world at large; 
rather, it is a vulnerability that arises as a matter of law because the 
operation of a tractor-trailer is subject to a detailed regulatory scheme 
that is itself justified on highway safety grounds. Indeed, the accused had 
a much stronger expectation of privacy vis-à-vis the world in general 
than vis-à-vis the RCMP officer who stopped them. An ordinary driver of 
a private vehicle would have had no authority to stop them in the first 
place; and if their vehicle was parked somewhere, a private individual 
who broke into the trailer or the tractor would likely commit a number of 
quite serious offences. But because the accused were engaged in a 
regulated activity, the police had significant powers to stop and make 
inquiries that substantially diminished their expectations of privacy. And 
regulatory search powers must themselves be constitutionally valid; they 
must satisfy the Hunter criteria52 or be based on considerations that 
provide an adequate substitute for those criteria. The approach in Nolet is 
encouraging precisely because it focuses on the legal setting of the 
interaction with the police rather than on the accused’s empirical vulner-
ability to the world at large. The main issue in the case is the legality of 
the police conduct, and that is as it should be; but that issue arises only 
because the Court recognized the accused’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the first place. 
IV. R. V. GOMBOC 
Nolet is mainly about search powers rather than about expectations of 
privacy. Gomboc,53 in contrast, is a major decision on the reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The significant differences of opinion in the Court 
flow not from disagreement about the facts — which were not really in 
issue — but from competing normative visions of the concept of a reason-
able expectation of privacy. While elements of the risk approach and the 
surveillance approach can be discerned in all three sets of reasons for 
judgment, the influence of the risk approach is strongest in the plurality 
reasons of Deschamps J., while the influence of the surveillance approach 
is strongest in the dissenting reasons of McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. 
The accused was charged with production of marijuana and other 
offences. The Calgary police and the RCMP had made observations and 
had gathered other information strongly suggesting the presence of a 
                                                                                                             
52  Supra, note 2. 
53  Supra, note 6. 
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marijuana “grow-op” in a residence owned by the accused.54 The final 
investigative step was to ask the accused’s electricity provider (the utility) to 
attach a digital recording ammeter (“DRA”) to the power line. A DRA 
measures the flow of current into a residence in one-amp increments over 
time.55 The DRA remained in place for five days. The data it gathered 
indicated a pattern of electricity use typical of a marijuana grow-op. These 
data, together with the other observations made and information gathered by 
the police, supported the issuance of a search warrant for the residence. 
When the warrant was executed, the police seized a substantial quantity of 
marijuana and evidence of a grow-op. 
The accused argued that the warrantless use of the DRA violated his 
section 8 right “to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure”. He 
therefore had to demonstrate that the use of the DRA intruded upon his 
reasonable expectation of privacy; if so, its use would be a presumptively 
unreasonable warrantless search, and, if the Crown could not demon-
strate a lawful basis for it, would violate his section 8 right. The trial 
judge found that the DRA did not intrude on the accused’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, admitted the evidence from the search, and 
convicted the accused. The accused’s appeal to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal was allowed on the basis that he did have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the information obtained from the DRA and that its 
warrantless use was unlawful and so violated his section 8 right.56 
The Crown’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was allowed 
and the conviction was restored. A 7-2 majority held that the accused did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data obtained from 
the DRA; however, the seven judges in the majority divided 4-3 as to 
why that was so. It is therefore possible that on slightly different facts the 
Court would divide 5-4 in favour of recognizing a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. 
Of the many factors relevant to determining the existence of a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, three were particularly important in 
Gomboc. First, what does the DRA indicate about what is happening in a 
home? There was no dispute that the DRA showed no more than, but also 
                                                                                                             
54  The Crown conceded at trial that this information did not amount to reasonable grounds 
for the issuance of a warrant. The wisdom of this concession has been questioned (Gomboc, id., at 
para. 12), but it certainly had the effect of making the effect of the DRA on the accused’s privacy the 
critical issue in the case. 
55  Id., at para. 61. 
56  The Court remitted the matter to the trial court for a determination of whether the evi-
dence should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
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no less than, the pattern of electricity consumption in the house over 
time, and that the pattern would fairly reliably indicate whether or not the 
house was being used for a marijuana grow-op.57 Second, what was the 
place searched? The DRA was installed in a transformer box near, but 
not on, the accused’s property; but it revealed information about what 
was happening inside the house.58 Third, what was the legal setting for 
the use of the DRA? There was no dispute about the terms and conditions 
governing the accused’s contract with his electricity supplier: the 
contract, in conjunction with the relevant Alberta regulation, permitted 
the utility to share “customer information” with the police as long as “the 
disclosure is not contrary to the express request of the customer.” The 
accused Gomboc had made no such request.59 
The way these factors are dealt with in the judgments indicates the 
relative importance of the risk approach and the surveillance approach to 
each group of judges. Justice Deschamps, for the four-judge plurality 
(Charron, Rothstein, and Cromwell JJ. concurred), emphasized the 
limited amount of information obtained from the DRA and therefore 
characterized it as a relatively unintrusive technique.60 While the infor-
mation obtained was information about activity in the accused’s home, 
where the privacy interest is high, she commented that this fact “should 
be not allowed to inflate the actual impact of the search”;61 information 
about what is happening in a home is not automatically entitled to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.62 Finally, she held that the utility 
could, on its own initiative, have installed a DRA and turned the results 
over to the police; thus, the accused could not reasonably consider these 
data to be “confidential or private”.63 It made no difference that the 
request to install the DRA came from the police.64 
Justice Deschamps’s reasons draw on both the risk analysis and the sur-
veillance approach, but the risk approach dominates. Given his failure to 
request non-disclosure under the regulation, the accused was, empirically 
speaking, vulnerable to the risk that the utility would gather and disclose 
information to the police; that the police, rather than the utility, put this 
process in motion made no difference. This reasoning is characteristic of the 
                                                                                                             
57  Gomboc, id., at paras. 7-9. 
58  Id., at para. 4. 
59  Id.,at para. 31; see also Code of Conduct Regulation, Alta. Reg. 160/2003, s. 10(3)(f). 
60  Gomboc, id., at para. 36. 
61  Id., at para. 50. 
62  Compare Tessling, supra, note 9; Plant, supra, note 11; and Patrick, supra, note 15. 
63  Gomboc, supra, note 6, at para. 41.  
64  Id., at para. 42. 
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risk approach; it is very similar to the “risk analysis” considered and 
rejected in Duarte. But at the same time, the technique is characterized as 
relatively unintrusive, so the need to constrain its unfettered use is 
correspondingly diminished. In a case where an accused ran exactly the 
same risk, but the information disclosed was plausibly characterized as 
being at the biographical core that informational privacy protects, the 
risk analysis and the surveillance approach would pull in different 
directions. 
And that was, more or less, how the three concurring judges saw it. 
Justice Abella (Binnie and LeBel JJ. concurring) found the DRA to be 
quite intrusive as it permitted the drawing of a “strong and reliable 
inference” about what was going on “inside the home”.65 And because of 
“the overriding significance of protecting the privacy interests in one’s 
home”, there was reason to be concerned about allowing the police to use 
this investigative technique with no judicial oversight.66 Thus, most of 
the factors pushed in the direction of recognizing a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. However, Abella J. refrained from expressly stating this 
conclusion because even if it was correct there was, in her view, a factor 
that weighed decisively against recognizing a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Because the accused had not requested confidentiality under the 
regulation, any expectation of privacy that he might have had was not 
objectively reasonable.67  
Justice Abella’s analysis of the relevant factors is much closer to sur-
veillance approach than the plurality’s. She sees the DRA as a device for 
determining what is going on inside the home, and therefore as properly 
subject to legal regulation. This reasoning is typical of the surveillance 
approach; it is not the accused’s empirical vulnerability to intrusion but 
the effect on privacy of permitting the intrusion without any legal 
authority that matters. Justice Deschamps treated the accused’s failure to 
request confidentiality as merely one factor in assessing his reasonable 
expectation of privacy; thus, even if he had so requested, she might have 
been prepared to find no expectation of privacy. In contrast, Abella J. 
treats the failure to request confidentiality as nearly decisive, indicating 
that she would likely have found a reasonable expectation of privacy if 
the accused had so requested. To put this point another way, suppose the 
accused had requested confidentiality but the utility had, on its own 
                                                                                                             
65  Id., at paras. 81 and 80 (emphasis in the original). 
66  Id., at para. 82. 
67  Id., at paras. 82-95. 
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initiative and contrary to the regulation, gathered the information and 
then disclosed it to the police. Would the accused’s section 8 rights have 
been infringed? Justice Deschamps suggests that they would not, because 
the DRA did not record “household activities of an intimate or private 
nature that form part of the inhabitants’ biographical core data”,68 so the 
accused would have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
DRA information. Justice Abella in contrast, suggests not only that the 
DRA did gather such core information, but also that for the police to 
obtain it in defiance of the customer’s express wishes would be an 
unlawful search: “A request by a customer to prohibit disclosure of 
customer information revokes the legislative authority for its disclo-
sure.”69 Moreover, she left open the possibility of challenging the 
regulation as an unreasonable law under section 8 of the Charter,70 a 
challenge which would be pointless if the regulation was not in essence a 
law authorizing search and seizure of information that would otherwise 
be protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Fish J. dissented. They agreed with 
much of Abella J.’s analysis, but went further and held that the DRA 
disclosed information that was subject to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.71 But, unlike Abella J., they held that the regulation did not 
defeat that expectation. In contrast to Nolet, where the reasonable trucker 
would be aware of the regulatory scheme governing trucking, “[t]he 
average consumer signing up for electricity cannot be expected to be 
aware of the details of a complex regulatory scheme … especially where 
a presumption of awareness operates to, in effect, narrow the consumer’s 
constitutional rights.”72 Thus, the accused had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the information obtained from the DRA. The use of the 
DRA was a search for section 8 purposes.73 
                                                                                                             
68  Id., at para. 36. 
69  Id., at para. 85. Justice Binnie concurred with Abella J. here, but contrast his reasons in 
Patrick, supra, note 15, where he held that the police’s failure to respect a by-law prohibiting 
garbage-picking had no effect on the accused’s expectation of privacy in his garbage. 
70  Gomboc, id., at paras. 86-91. 
71  Id., at paras. 105 and 124. 
72  Id., at para. 139. Justice Abella suggests that this consideration would subjectivize the 
analysis of a reasonable expectation of privacy: at para. 93. Yet the dissenters are clearly concerned 
not with Gomboc’s knowledge, but with the reasonable person’s likely awareness, of the regulation: 
id., at para. 142. 
73  The dissenters went on to hold that there was no lawful authority for the search; conse-
quently, the accused’s s. 8 rights were violated. The dissenters would have remitted the case for 
further argument on the question whether the evidence obtained from the DRA (and from the 
physical search that followed) should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
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The dissenters are strongly motivated by the normative concerns that 
underlie the surveillance approach. The DRA enables the person analyz-
ing the data it generates to make an informed prediction as to “whether 
anyone is home, the approximate time at which the occupants go to bed 
and wake up, and … [the] particular appliances being used” as well as 
whether plants are being grown.74 If there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in that information, if the police can ask the utility to disclose it 
without reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has occurred and 
that the information will disclose evidence of the offence, could not the 
police also, without reasonable grounds, ask a cable company to gather 
information on what programs a person is watching, or a plumber to 
gather information about the contents of a person’s bathroom while in a 
person’s home for the stated purpose of repairing a toilet?75 The dissent-
ers see the plurality’s decision as “an incremental but ominous step 
toward the erosion of the right to privacy guaranteed by section 8”76 
because they fear that the majority’s approach will be unable to distin-
guish such cases from the situation in Gomboc itself. There is nothing 
wrongful or shameful about a person’s pattern of sleeping and waking, or 
about the contents of a person’s bathroom cupboard, but it is no one’s 
business either. One can assume that watching a television program via a 
regulated provider such as Bell or Rogers is always lawful (otherwise 
they would not be permitted to broadcast it), but for the state to keep 
records of what people watch is likely to inhibit their Charter-protected 
interests in freedom of thought, opinion and expression. Who would not 
be affected in their choice of what to watch, or when to sleep, or what to 
keep in the cupboard, by the knowledge that the state, in its unfettered 
discretion, could keep track? These examples may seem remote from the 
DRA that was at issue in Gomboc, but the logic of the risk approach 
makes it hard to distinguish them. The surveillance approach is much 
more likely to protect the values underlying the section 8 privacy interest 
because it more effectively takes into account the concern about unfet-
tered intrusion into areas where individuals are likely to engage in, or to 
leave information about, the activities that are central to the privacy 
interest protected by section 8. 
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76  Id., at para. 97. 
(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)   REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY 355 
V. CONCLUSION 
Section 8 of the Charter protects a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The reason for protecting a reasonable expectation of privacy is to create 
a zone of privacy in which every individual can engage in activities that 
are essential to the making of the human self but that are often consid-
ered shameful or embarrassing, and may be seriously inhibited, if 
routinely recorded or exposed to observation by others. The Supreme 
Court of Canada’s methodology for determining the existence of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy contains two dominant methodological 
strands — the risk approach, which focuses on the factual vulnerability 
of the place or the information, and the surveillance approach, which 
focuses on concerns about unfettered use of the technique in question. In 
Gomboc, these two competing approaches come face to face. The 
investigative technique at issue is a device that records the pattern of 
electricity use over time. Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
this information? The four-judge plurality regards the information itself 
as relatively unintrusive, but is also moved by the relative ease with 
which it could be gathered by the utility, while apparently remaining 
unconcerned about the impact of this kind of observation on the values 
protected by the right to privacy. In contrast, the remaining five judges, 
like La Forest J. in Duarte, recognize that the relative ease of gathering 
information about what is going on in a home through techniques of 
electronic surveillance does not mean that the inhabitants of the home 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy. It is not the ease of informa-
tion-gathering, but its impact on the human interests in authenticity, 
intimacy and self-presentation that should be protected by section 8 of 
the Charter, and should drive the question of the reasonable expectation 
of privacy. 
  
